Abuse Report: Active portscan/attack detected from 94.156.117.28

This is an automated abuse complaint regarding suspection of device infection
within your network behind IP address 94.156.117.28
---

Our isolated systems has received multiple unsolicited incoming connections
from an IP address under your control (abuse-mailbox as per RIR database). All
unsolicited connections reported below have completed three-way handshake
procedure defined per Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This ensures that
our evidence was not tampered upon any external party posessing a source IP
address spoofing capability, because three-way handshake procedure requires
both receiving (device within our network) and sending (device within your
network) parties to receive reply of another party to complete handshake.

The aforementioned isolated systems within our network are hosted at unused IP
address space and are implemented as a TCP listener, so that we can be sure our
evidence actually covering "unsolicited" and "not spoofed" activity.

The activity we are reporting is often referred to as "service probing" or
"banner grabbing". Unlike typical "port scan" type of abuse complaints you
might receive, our complaints are not induced by a single or multiple TCP
packets with SYN flag set. Instead, as was mentioned previously, three-way
handshake procedure is required. To eliminate possible false-positive alerts
caused by human typo, abuse complaint is generated only upon having four (4)
distinct successful connections as per (Source IP; Destination IP; Destination
Port) tuple.

To minimize "Internet background noise" our network observes, the reported IP
address was temporarily banned. Do not worry, it will be unblocked
automatically soon. If it is the first report for this IP address within 90
days, block lasts 24 hours. Each following report within this timeframe extends
blocking duration for 24 hours.

As for implications for your network, we suspect that device within your
network is infected with a malware. However, sometimes there are another
reasons, namely:

- device hosts publicly accessible proxy or VPN (either intentionally, due to
software misconfiguration or due to usage of "proxyware" type of software);
- device is infected with a malware (for example, networking worm, most frequently
this happens with IoT and DVR/IP cameras);
- device (for example, server) is used by an malicious actor for exploitation
purposes (see "unethical hacking");
- device is used by a legitimate Internet security researchers team that can be
clearly attributed using Forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS).

Given exact reason in this situation, you would like either to communicate with
your client to address this issue as per Terms of Service of your organization
or notify us of legitimate nature of this activity. When it comes to legitimate
security researchers, we are always co-operating to whitelist your networks as
long as FCrDNS is valid.

Please note that we are providing hosting services, hence you are strongly
discouraged from blocking any of the destination IP addresses mentioned below.

If these complaints are considered irrelevant by your team for any reason, do
not hesitate to let us know by replying to this letter. We will exclude your
abuse-mailbox from receiving these abuse complaints in the future.

Incident details are attached below. Please note that due to some automated
abuse complaint processing systems parsing destination IP addresses as ones
involved to this report, we are redacting destination IP addresses replacing
all "." and ":" characters with "x".

```
Timestamp SrcIP SrcPort DstIP DstPort
2025-09-09T17:17:22.99Z 94.156.117.28 43340 88x218x206x117 22
2025-09-10T01:35:02.053Z 94.156.117.28 41142 88x218x206x252 22
2025-09-10T04:20:21.265Z 94.156.117.28 36714 88x218x206x29 22
2025-09-10T10:06:35.113Z 94.156.117.28 48830 142x132x237x176 22
------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

As was mentioned previously, the table above lists all unsolicited TCP
connections that have completed three-way handshake. This prevents us from
producing false-positive alerts. It is worth to note that we aren't closing the
connection immediately after three-way handshake was completed, thus you should
see communication from your sFlow monitoring. If you are using NetFlow or
IPFIX, you should be able to see all four (4) flows. If you don't implement any
of those, do not hesitate to ask us for more detailed logs.

Kind regards,
Network department
Skhron